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WATER RIGHTS OF VARIOUS LEVELS OF GOVERNMENTSTATES' RIGHTS vs. NATIONAL POWERSt
Frank 1. Trelease*

This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall
be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall
be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the
supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be
bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State
to the Contrary notwithstanding.

-U.

S. Constitution, Article VI

"If you can't lick 'em, join 'em."

-Unknown

policician

Inevitably, a discussion of the power of one level of government over
water resources involves a comparison with the powers of other levels. A
catalogue of national powers, followed by a list of state powers, would be a
meaningless exercise. The only reason for a paper such as this at a conference such as this is that in recent years, much talk and political activity has
been focused upon the problem of states' rights to water as contrasted with
federal power over water.
At the same time, the doctrine of states' rights has been much mooted in a
very different context-that of racial segregation. Yet there are some parallels between the two controversies. One aspect, common to both, is the unrelenting nature of the arguments of proponents of states' rights, the unwillingness of those proponents to concede that the national government has any
case other than a bald usurpation of power. Reviewing the segregation controversy, a Northern law professor analyzed the writing of Southern lawyers
in ten years of a leading southern publication.1 He found nothing but unmitigated blasts at the United States Supreme Court's "communistic, atheistic,
No writer in that journal so
nihilistic destruction of the Constitution."
much as attempted to spell out the other side of the argument, or to anlalyze
the strength of the federal position. This is a wide departure from traditional legal method, for "the lawyer who cannot see his opponent's side or
the difficulties in his own case gropes in a blindness that is often fatal."
Much the same one-sided quality has pervaded the writings and statements of the proponents of states' rights to water, going back to the brief
for "Preservation of Integrity of State Water Laws," promulgated by the
National Reclamation Association in 1942, through the long series of hearings
of Senate and House committees on the Barrett bill and its successors, inA paper delivered at 1965 Western Interstate Water Conference held at Oregon State
University, Corvallis, Oregon, Aug. 5-6, 1965.
* Dean and Professor of Law, University of Wyoming.
1. Frankel, Alabama Lawyer, 1954-1964: Has the Official Organ Atrophied?, 64 COLUM.
L. REv. 1243 (1964).
t
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eluding today's Kuchel bill.2 Only a few non-federal voices raised in the
bearings have conceded any validity to the national position or any legitimate
3
national purposes to be served by national supremacy in the water field.
Practically all state representatives see the question of state versus federal
supremacy over Western water as a conflict, a struggle, a fight. Such an
approach is futile, and there is danger in inviting a battle to the finish. The
Western states cannot win such a battle. Despite the plausible arguments made
in one-sided briefs, and the seemingly impeccable logic derived from state
4
Subliminally,
premises of "ownership" of water, they cannot win a lawsuit.
they realize this, for the battle has been shifted to the legislative arena. But
they cannot win in Congress. Nine years and fifty bills after the original
Barrett bill the states stand in no better position than they did in 1956, when
the first attempts to overthrow the Pelton doctrine were made.- The time has
come to take a realistic approach to the subject and a realistic attitude toward
the relations of the states and the nation in the water resources field.
A realist does not seek an abstraction, but an objective. The doctrine of
states' rights is no more than a tool that may accomplish a desired result.
Too often, the doctrine of states' rights in water, like that of states' rights in
the segregation field, has been something considerably less than a noble
political principle. It has been called upon to protect or advance some special
advantage, as when large landowners seek exemption from the policy of the
160 acre limitation," or when one state seeks an advantage over another, as in
the early days when equitable apportionment was being fought out' or whcn
Arizona sought to block the Boulder Canyon Project. s All such attempts to
use the doctrine of states' rights to stymie the national government or to put
a single state's interest above those of the nation or of a sister state, as a
matter of right, as a rule of law, have failed.
On the other hand, the Western states have tried to assert the doctrine
of states' rights in water in order to further or to preserve some very legitimate
state interests. The desire to preserve property rights of citizens, the desire
to see their state develop and prosper, the desire to plan and shape the future
of states' rights in water in order to further or to preserve some very legitimate
that these objectives may be lost if the battle is fought out on the wrong field.
2.

Hearings on S. 86.3 Before the Senate Subcommittee on Irrigation and Reclamation,
84th Cong., 2d SESS. (1956) ; Hearings' Before the House Committee on Interior and
Insular Affairs, 84th Cong., 2d SEss., ser. 31 (1956); Hearings Before the House
Subcominitte on Irrigation and Reclamation, 86th Cong., 1st SESS., ser. 9 (1959).
Hearings on Problems Arising from Relationships between the States and the Federal
Government Before the Senate Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, 87th Cong.,

1st SF:ss. (1961) ; Hearings on S. 1275 Before a Subcommittee of the Senate Co,,,mittee
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

on Interior and Insular /ffairs, 88th Cong., 2d SESS. (1964).
See remarks of Goldberg, Clark and Ely, 1964 Senate Hearings, supra note 2, at 120,
148, 243.
Goldberg, Interposition-Wild West Water Style, 17 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1964).
Note, Federal Water Rights Legislation and the Reserved Lands Controversy,
53 GEO. L. J. 750 (1965).
Ivanhoe Irr. Dist. v. McCracken, 357 U.S. 275 (1958).
Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46 (1907) ; Wyoming v. Colorado, 259 U.S. 419 (1922).
Arizona v. California, 283 U.S. 423 (1931).

1965

STATES' RIGHTS VS. NATIONAL POWERS

If the decision is cast in terms of power, the result may be winner-take-all.
But if the question is not the existence of power but the desirability of its
exercise, compromise and accommodation are more likely to be achieved.
FEDERAL POWERS

If the United States is regarded as an opponent by the Western states,
it is a formidable one indeed. It has a number of powerful weapons at its
command. Though some of them look disarmingly simple, many are flexible
and sophisticated, suitable for use in a wide variety of situations.
The federal government derives its authority from the Constitution of
the United States. It has only such powers as are delegated to it by that
instrument. But the founding fathers provided for a strong nation. Powers
that permit the national government to take action on water resources or to
regulate their use are found in the authority given by the Constitution to
control commerce, to provide for the common defense, to enter into treaties,
to control interstate relations, to manage federal property, and to provide for
the general welfare of the country. Freedom to perform these functions
witfiout let or hindrance from the states is given by the supremacy clause.
The most highly developed body of federal water law is in relation to
navigable waters. The Constitution gives Congress the power to regulate
interstate commerce, 9 which includes navigation as a part of transportation.
The federal power over navigable waters has been exercised in three waysaffirmatively, negatively, and permissively. Affirmatively, the United States
may improve navigation channels, or build dams to provide a flow for navigable streams or protect the navigability of waters from floods or prevent the
Negatively, the United States
waters from doing flood damage to land.'"
the navigable capacity of the
with
interfering
from
else
may prohibit anyone
do
that which it might do or
Permissively, it may license others to
water."
2
Since the national powers are supreme, the United States'
might prevent.'
action in reference to a navigable river is not subject to state laws which on
3
If a state-authorized project affects
their face seem to apply to all waters.'
navigable waters in a way inconsistent with federal law, the non-federal
project must give way. 14 If a state-created right, or a state-authorized project,
exists on a navigable river, and Congress decides to build a federal project
that destroys the state right or project, the national government is under no
obligation to pay compensation for the loss of the right or even for the
destruction of a going business." As far as the federal government is concerned, whatever rights a state may attempt to create in these waters are subject to the navigation servitude, an easement that is a defect in the title to such
9.

U. S. CONST. art. 1, §8.

10. United States
313 U.S. 508
11. United States
12. United States

v. Commodore Park, Inc., 324 U.S. 386 (1945); Oklahoma v. Atkinson,
(1941).
v. Rio Grande Irr. Co., 174 U.S. 690 (1899).
v. Appalachian Power Co., 311 U.S. 377 (1940).

13. Arizona v. California, supra note 8.
14. See Rio Grande and Appalachian, supra notes 11 and 12.
15. United States v. Chandler-Dunbar Co., 229 U.S. 53 (1913).
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rights. Though at one time there was hope that this servitude did not weaken
the title to Western appropriative rights,"0 there seems to be nothing to distinquish Western consumptive uses from the riparian rights that have been
destroyed or taken without compensation. 1 7 In the area of planning, the
federal government may overrule a state plan for water resources by building
a federal project that is inconsistent with the plan. 8 Finally, in Arizona v.
California,"0 the Supreme Court has now said that the power to dam and store
the water of a navigable stream gives the power to distribute the water to
states in such shares as Congress or its delegate may determine. Eqtkitable
apportionment-the legal claim of a state to a share in the benefits of a riverplayed no part in the decision.
The war and treaty powers 20 give additional authority to the United
States to build projects that will strengthen the national defense or comply
with a treaty. The exercise of the war power has not been undertaken in
such a way as to bring its resource development projects into direct conflict
with state water laws or water rights. Normally, property taken for national
defense purposes is condemned under the power of eminent domain. However,
when it was coupled with the power to control the property of the United States,
in the famous Hawthorne case, "'1 the court said that if the United States needs
water for a national defense installation on the public domain, it need not
"bend its knee" and comply with a state water law that might interfere with the
management of property in the best interests of national defense. But the
treaty power is like that over navigable waters, and states have conceded their
duty to meet a national obligation such as the agreement to deliver annually a
specific quantity of the water of the Colorado River to Mexico, 22 even though
this might require state uses of water to be curtailed.
While interstate lawsuits and compacts may operate as a restriction on
state law or state-created rights, the most important power of the federal
government over interstate relations is the power to refuse Congressional consent. Congress has refused to approve a compact, and one was killed when
the President vetoed the act consenting to it on the ground that it would inter23
fere with the jurisdiction and authoriy of the United States over the water.
The proprietary power is less well developed than the power over navigable waters, but in recent years has given rise to the most controversy, in
"[W]e need not ponder whether by virtue of a highly fictional navigation purpose,
the government could destroy the flow of a navigable stream and carry away its waters
for sale to private interests without compensation to those deprived of them. We have
never held that or anything like it ... ." United States v. Gerlach Livestock Co.,
339 U.S. 725, 737 (1950). Mr. Justice Douglas, concurring, thought the constitutional
power to do so was clear. Id. at 756-62.
17. Morreale, Federal Power in Western Waters: The Navigation Power and the Rule of
No Compensation, 3 NATIRtL Rsosuttces J. 1 (1963).
18. Oklahoma v. Atkinson, supra note 10.
19. 373 U.S. 546 (1963).
20. U.S. CONST. art. I, §8; art. II, §2.
21. Nevada v. United States, 165 F. Supp. 600 (D. Nev. 1958).
22. 59 Stat. 1219 (1944) ; COLO. Rlv. COMPACT art. III(c) (1922).
23. Consent to the Connecticut and Merrimac Rivers Compact (1937) failed of passage;
the President's veto message in H. R. Doc. 690, 77th Cong. 2d SEss. (1942).
16.
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the political arena if not in the courts. The property clause of the Constitution 24 reads as follows: "The Congress shall have the power to dispose of and
make all needful rules and regulations respecting the territory or other property
belonging to the United States."
In the Western states, the most important national property is land, the
public domain, the vast areas of public land, national forests, national parks
and Indian, military and other reservations. Whether or not the United
States "owns" the waters on these lands, it is now clear that it has the power
to use the water on the reserved lands to further the purposes for which the
-reservation was made.
The reservation of the water may be exercised and the water put to use
without regard to state law, and in a manner inconsistent with it. The reservation may be exercised by taking the water for the reserved purpose even
though this means taking it without compensation from persons who hold
state rights to the water and who have put it to beneficial use. The Pelton.
Dam case, 25 Federal Power Comm'n 'v.Oregon, established the first proposition and Arizona v. California2 realized the Western irrigators' worst fears
as to the second. Implementation of the decree in that case will take water
away from California irrigators and cities and put it to use on Indian reserva27
tions, national forests, recreational areas and wildlife refuges.
Yet this should not have come as a surprise. The rule as to Indian reservations was established in 1908,28 and in 1899 the Supreme Court warned that
a state could not, without Congressional consent, "destroy the right of the
United States, as the owner of lands bordering on a stream, to the continued
flow of its waters; so far at least as may be necessary for the beneficial uses of
'29
the governmental property.
There are other national proprietary interests, not connected with land,
that affect water and its use. When in the exercise of one of its powers the
United States controls the flow of a river by storing water, it owns the power
potential in the stored water, it may produce electric energy with that potential, and the electric energy thus produced is property of the United States
which the government may sell or lease upon its own terms.30 Nebraska once
had a policy, based on its claims to ownership of the water in its streams, that
hydro-electric power generated in Nebraska could not be transmitted or used
beyond the confines of the state.3 1 Obviously, this policy could not restrict the
out-of-state disposition of power produced at a federal dam.
Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution gives Congress the power to levy
taxes and to appropriate funds to provide for the general welfare of the United
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.

U.S. CONST. art. IV, §3.
F.P.C. v. Oregon, 349 U.S 435 (1955).
Arizona v. California, supra note 19.
Ibid.
Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564 (1908).
United States v. Rio Grande, supra note 11, at 703.
Ashwander v. T.V.A., 297 U.S. 288 (1936).
Kirk v. State Board of Irr., 90 Neb. 627, 134 N.W. 167 (1912).
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States. 32 In the famous case of United States v. Gerlach Livestock Company,
the Court said that one of the largest federal basin-wide development projectsthe Central Valley Project in California--could be sustained under this power.
"Congress has a substantive power to tax and appropriate money for the
general welfare, limited only by the requirement that it shall be exercised
for the common benefit as distinguished from some mere local purpose ...
Thus the power of Congress to promote the general welfare through largescale projects for reclamation, irrigation, and other internal improvement is
M
now . . . clear. ....
This is the power of the purse. It broadens considerably the power of
the United States to take action, to spend money for the construction of
'projects-and to withhold funds and limit its bounty if a state should be
recalcitrant.3 4 In addition, the spending power can provide a new ground for
control of local activities. In the Ivanhoe Irr. Dist. v. McCraken case, on
the 160-acre limitation, 35 the Court said, "It is hardly lack of due process for
By tying enough
thd Government to regulate that which it subsidizes."
,strings to its money, by imposing conditions upon those who receive the benefits, the government may impose upon them rules and regulations over and
above those required by state law.
STATE POWERS

The powers of the states in the field of water resources stem not from
express delegations in state constitutions, but from the general residuum of
sovereignty and imperium left to the states after the grant of specific powers
to the United States. These include the power to create property rights and
the police power to regulate property rights and the conduct of citizens in
the public interest. State water laws have been traditionally directed to allocating water rights to individuals as property, in order to further the economic
gain of the individuals. In the West, this has primarily taken the form of the
law of prior appropriation.
The invention of prior appropriation was a master stroke in which the
Western states justifiably take pride. The aridity of the climate and the
scarcity of water were limiting factors on development from the start. There
was not water enough to satisfy all demands that could be made upon it. Yet
no planners prepared blueprints for its best use. Instead, the water was given
to any and all who would put it to beneficial use. The miner used it to obtain
the mineral wealth of the mountains and streams; the farmers turned the
desert into rich crop lands free from drought; the rancher took the water for
his stock and to irrigate hay for winter feed; cities brought in supplies that
enabled them to grow; railroads, power companies, manufacturers and other
industries received the water they needed to operate. The Western pioneers
recognized that development by an individual in his private interest could also

32.
33.

U.S. CONST. art. 1, §8.
United States v. Gerlach Livestock Co., .upra note 16, at 738.

34. Cf. Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§2000d-d-3 (1964).
35. Ivanhoe Irr. Dist. v. McCracken, supra note 6.
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be development in the public interest. Water was used to produce wealth.
The increase in the wealth of the citizens, from these property interests carved
out of the public domain, increased the wealth of, and developed the resources
of, the Western states and the nation.
Giving the best water rights to senior appropriators encouraged junior
appropriators to build dams to store spring floods, to build larger dams that
would store the supply of good years against future droughts, or to bring
water from long distances across or through mountain ranges from other
basins where the supply exceeded the local demands. When it became obvious
that completely unregulated appropriation might not always be in the public
-interest, the states invented administrative controls to prevent would-be appropriators from injuring the vested rights of others or doing acts that would
be detrimental to the public interest. Agencies and officers administered the
water laws and distributed the water to those entitled to it.
These property rights do not freeze development. If needs change, the
water right can be changed to the new need. As the economy matures, as
cities and industries need water from already fully appropriated sources,
Western water law provides for the reallocation of water rights by economic
forces. No administrator reallocates the water to the higher use. The city
or the industrialist simply offers to buy the water, tendering enough money
to make it attractive to the farmer to cease irrigating. The process is the
same as if the farmer's land were needed for an airport or a factory site.
The city has the additional power to condemn the water right to insure its
transfer at a fair price. This is the system of firm property rights in water upon
which Westerners have built their irrigated agriculture and their modem cities
and industries.
States also have powers to take action. Absent a self-imposed restriction
against a state engaging in works of internal improvement or borrowing
money or lending its credit, states have power to use their own tax money
and bonding capacity for water resources development. California's State
Water Plan is the outstanding example in this area. And all states may
create agencies to construct water control works up to river basin size, such
as the Texas river authorities. Most commonly, these are some variant of the
irrigation district or conservancy district and bring into the picture a third
level, of local government. Today's great cities, and districts created as quasimunicipal corporations, armed with some delegated powers of government,
nay borrow money, construct projects, and tax, assess, or charge tolls to
pay off the bonds. If one state may not act alone on an interstate stream,
it may join with others in a fourth level of government, and by interstate
compact jointly construct works without federal aid, as Texas and Louisiana
are doing in the Toledo Bend project on the Sabine river.
All of these state powers, laws, private property rights and future plans
based upon them, must, as we have seen, give way when the United States
chooses to enforce a national policy that does not coincide with the state
policy. This does not mean that the United States has taken over the state
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water law, that water law is now federal law, or that state agencies have been
put out of business. On the contrary, the day to day administration of existing rights and current appropriation goes on much as usual, litigants in state
courts continue to call on state statutes or decisions in arguing their cases,
and state officials and agencies busily plan future developments. The fact
is that while the national government may be omnipotent, it is not omnipresent. Since the federal jurisdiction is a conditional one, it may be ignored
when the federal interest is not present or is not being exercised. The Supreme Court of the United States has recognized the vital interest of the states
in the control of water resources, and has specifically conceded the powers
of the states to exercise control over navigable waters for the interests of their
citizens. The states were said to have "traditional jurisdiction," not subject
36
to challenge until Congress in some way asserts its superior power.
The state is part of the nation, and its representatives in Congress help to
shape national policy. Many local and national interests coincide. The states
often seek the aid of the federal government in the form of projects promising local as well as national benefits.
In many national laws Congress has chosen to waive federal powers and
has written into the legislation provisions for the recognition and even use
by the federal government of state water laws. In several instances Congress
has chosen to use less than all of its powers, and has elected to recognize statecreated rights even though it was under no constitutional obligation to do so.
The Central Valley Project could have been undertaken as an exercise of the
commerce power, and water rights for the project could have been taken under
the navigation servitude, without compensation. Instead, Congress made
reclamation law applicable, which requires condemnation of and payment
37
for any water rights taken in aid of a reclamation project.

In the Federal

Power Act, Congress did not delegate to its licensees the government's powers
to destroy the riparian rights of others, and provided that if the government
grants a license under the Power Act and then recaptures the plant, it will pay

88
an amount that includes the investment of the licensee in state water rights.

Indeed, Congress has gone further and reversed the servitude in relation to
certain Western streams. The O'Mahoney-Milliken amendment to the Flood
Control Act of 194439 provides that in the operation of the Pick-Sloan projects the use of water for navigation will be subordinate to present and future
beneficial consumptive uses-in other words, irrigation ditches will never be
closed to supply water to float barges.
In practically every piece of legislation establishing federal water agencies
and authorizing them to prosecute projects, there are procedures for consultation with state and local authorities and for reconciling conflicts with state
36. First Iowa Hydro-Electric Corp. v. F.P.C., 328 U.S. 152 (1946).
37. United States v. Gerlach, supra note 16.
38. Niagara-Mohawk Power Co. v. F.P.C., 347 U.S. 239 (1954).
39. 33 U.S.C. 701-1 (1964).
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and local interests. In every major water development field, Congress has
40
established mechanisms for obtaining a local voice in planning.
CONFLICTS OF INTERESTS

If the law of national supremacy is so clear, if these lines of communication exist, what is all the shooting about? Why have the states so loudly
proclaimed their ownership of water while at the same time so long petitioned
Congress for an act to subordinate national water activity to state law? Some
writers have ascribed cynical and less pure motives to the present proponents
.of states' rights. It is suggested that some of the states are back doing business at the old stand, that some seek to gain an advantage over others by
shackling the federal government's present and future plans for regional development. 41 It is hinted that some interests hope to overthrow the Ivanhoe
ruling on the 160-acre limitation. 42 No purer motives are ascribed to their
43
federal opponents, who are accused of being power-hungry bureaucrats,
seeking to freeze out state and private enterprise and create a federal monopoly
in water resources development. 44 Yet both levels of government have honorable and valid motives.
The national interests are those inherent in the word "nation." The
United States is a single nation, not a congeries of states. As a unified nation,
it has an interest in all parts of its territory. It must take a broad view, and
consider each part in relation to the whole. It must manage its resources
for the benefit of all of its people, not only for the benefit of those who live in
the locality of the resources. The funds it spends in one area are gathered
from all of its citizens, and it therefore has some responsibility for seeing that
benefits go to all the people. In providing for the general welfare, it nmay
make local improvements, but it does so only when the collective good is
thereby increased. It must develop itself as a nation, and in so doing it may
often perform acts in one state in order to receive benefits in another. It
must manage its property not for local benefit but for the national benefit.
It sometimes must use its overriding powers to settle rivalries and conflicts
between states. It must apply national policies nation-wide, though it may
do so with variants suitable to different locales.
Although the states take a more parochial view, they have many legitimate interests in water development within their borders, regardless of who
does the developing. They represent their citizens who live in the area, whose
lives and whose children's lives are affected, who own much of the property
involved, who may be called upon to pay for much of the development. One
of the most important state interests is the preservation of the property rights
of its citizens. The difference between irrigated crop land and desert pasture
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

These are detailed in Trelease, Federal Limitations on State Water Law, 10 BUFFALO
L. REV. 399 (1961).
Goldberg, supra note 4, at 4.
Clark, Statement, 1964 Senate Hearings, supra note 2.
Martz, Water for Mushrooming Populations, 62 W. VA. L. REV. 1 (1959).
Note Federal Water Rights Legislation and the Reserved Lands Controversy, supra
note 5.
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represents most of the value of Western farms. Firm water rights are required
to encourage investment in industrial development, and to permit the growth
of cities. The states have undertaken the orderly administration of water
rights, and they need to know what those rights are.
Over and above the preservation of the status quo, the states have an
interest in the future development of their territory. They believe that the
choice' between growth and stagnation should not be made elsewhere, that
they should have a voice in whether their resources are developed or set on
the shelf. Federal water resources programs in the Western states affect
those states' people, their prosperity, their institutions. The states have a
knowledge of local needs and problems, they have plans to solve them. They
desire their plans for water to be integrated and coordinated with other state
resources and interests. They therefore wish a voice in the plans of the
United States.
The states' interests in the future development of the waters stem in part
from the promise of the national government that they will share in the benefits
of the waters within their borders. The enforceability of this promise is a
matter of doubt, but the United States Supreme Court has said that few public
interests are more obvious and indisputable than the interest of a state to
maintain its rivers, which were described as great foundations of public welfare.45 Each is said to have an interest above that of its individual citizens
and above its individual property rights, and each state was said to be entitled to an equitable apportionment of the benefits resulting from the flow of
the rivers. 4 6 Some states have had specific portions of the waters of interstate rivers allotted to them by the Supreme Court, or by Congress, or by
compact approved by Congress. Even though a river is not yet apportioned,
the states have very real though unidentified claims in it. This is a national
policy, giving to each state the power and the hope of some degree of selfdetermination and self-development, by allocating to each a share in its rivers,
to be held as a local asset, held in reserve perhaps, but offering the promise
of future wealth.
When all of these interests are sifted, two core issues emerge. First,
should the United States, for its own purposes, take water from present users
without cormpensation? Second, should the United States initiate projects for
unappropriated water without reference to the wishes of the states in which
the project is located?
On the first issue, the navigation servitude, the reservation of water for
use on reserved lands and the other federal possibilities of uncompensated
destruction of state water rights, all strike at the very heart of state water law.
They make the state-created property right insecure. This not only creates fear
in the hearts of present appropriators, but it has a tendency to discourage
investment in water-based activities and to hinder the growth of the states by
restricting the activity of the private sector. Another effect is to throw a
45. Hudson County Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349 (1908).
46. Kansas v. Colorado, supra note 7.
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monkey wrench into state planning activities and to disturb the state machinery
for the orderly administration of water rights and for water distribution. On
the second issue, the ability of the United States to proceed with projects without reference to state law leads to fears that, in the federal planning, local
benefits will be sacrificed and local costs will be discounted,
The position of the United States on the first issue is that negation of the
reserved waters doctrine would defeat the purposes for which the reservation
of land were made, and that when the water was needed for the national purpose, the government would be forced to buy back the very water it gave
47
On the second issue the United States
away, possibly at a prohibitive cost.
has very valid reasons for not wishing "to bend its knee" to state officials, to
have national projects subjected to a state veto, or limited to purposes recognized by a state. National policies might not be uniformly applied throughout the nation. For example, the storage of water for future release to ease the
48
pollution burden of streams in periods of low flow is now a national policy,
49
it is argued that it
and while this is clearly a beneficial use in Oregon,
0
Is wildlife management for recreation a beneis not beneficial in Colorado.51
A fragmented national policy
ficial use in Utah as it seems to be in Texas?
does not appeal to national officials.
SOLUTIONS

If the only solution to this clash .of interests is a legal decision on states'
rights, the Western states are lost. The law is on the nation's side. Whatever
Js meant by the proud phrase: "The waters of all natural streams . . . are
' ''2
in giving power to the
hereby declared to be the property of the state,
states to regulate its citizens, it does not mean that it gives power to regulate
the national government. The United States Constitution and laws are the
supreme law of the land.
The time has come for the Western states to learn to live with the national
government. If national powers are capable of overriding state powers, if
national interests are superior to state interests, the states must seek protection
of their interests by some means other than asserting a rule of law that does
not exist, or attempting to create that rule of law by Congress. The Western
states must recognize the federal authority, but they must use it, they must
mold federal policy. They must convince the national government of the
intrinsic worth of state interests as national interests, and as worthy of consideration and fair treatment by the national government. Actually a great
deal of this has been done in the past. National policies for Western develop47.

Statement of Ramsey Clark, 1961 Senate Hearings, supra note 2, at 35; Statement of

Senator Clinton P. Anderson, 1964 Senate Hearings, supra note 2, at 39.
33 U.S.C. 466a (b)(1) (1964).
Oait. REV. STAT. §537.170 (1963).
See Note, Water Pollution Control in Colorado, 36 U. COLO. L. REV. 413 (1964).
Compare Lake Shore Duck Club v. Lake View Duck Club, 50 Utah 76, 166 Pac. 309
(1917), with Diversion Lake Club v. Heath, 126 Tex. 129, 86 S.W.2d 441 (1935).
52. WYO. CoNST. art. 8, §1 (1889). Similar provisions in other state constitutions and
laws are detailed in Trelease, Government Ownership and Trusteeship of Water,
45 CALIF. L. REV. 638, 641 (1957).

48.
49.
50.
51.
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ment gave us reclamation and multi-purpose projects that were in the public
interest of both the nation and the states.
On the issue of the states' interests in water projects, the answer lies not
in subordinating the national government to state water law. It simply wilh
rnot happen. It is not the law today, for Congress did not pass the Barrett
5
bill, and it would not pass the original Kuchel bill " with such a clause in it.
The United States government could not live with it. But a state could live
with a "federal" water right for dilution of pollution, or for recreation, or one
that gave a farmer less water than the state would, or water for less land, or
even one that could not be used for growing certain crops.
What is really needed is not state control over federal water rights but
a stronger state voice in the planning and operation of federal projects. Last
year a thoughtful state official said:
The real answer to federal encroachment is the assumption of
greater responsibilities by the states, not the head-on collision of
forces. In such a collision the states are bound to come out second
best. It is possible for a state and the United States to develop a
Problems of regional development canreasonable modus vivendi ....
not be54 solved by the simple application of . . . concepts of water
rights.
He echoed a thought expressed in 1957 by one of this conference's planners,
who suggested that if the states wish a stronger voice in the national water
development area, they will get it in proportion to the amount they increase
their financial contributions, and as fast as they devise responsible state
agencies capable of policy formulation and project management, free from
55
Perhaps the voices of the states
undue pressures from local special interests.
in the newly-proposed Westchorus
in
raised
nay be strengthened if they are
ern States Water Council.
In addition to a strong voice, the states and the United States need better
lines of communication. Perhaps a fourth level of government is needed, a
56
federal-state compact commission like that of the Delaware River Compact,
5 7
Perhaps the new River Basin
or the once-proposed Missouri Basin Compact.
Commissions created by the Water Resources Planning Act of 1965 will fill
the need. Perhaps improved communications could clear up the remaining
issue-that of compensation for impairment of security of state-granted water
Tights.
On this issue of a state desire for secure water rights versus federal reluctance to buy back what it has given away, the solution seems a simple one,
yet one that is somehow just beyond our grasp. All that is needed is for fed53. S. 1275, 88th Cong., 1st SEss. (1963).
54. Goldberg, supra note 4, at 37.
55. Englebert, Federalism and Water Resources Development, 22 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB.
325 (1957).
56. 75 Stat. 688 (1961).
57. Trelease, A Federal-State Compact for Missouri Basin Development, 7 Wvo. L. J. 161
(1953).

1965

STATES' RIGHTS VS. NATIONAL

POWERS

eral officials on the policy-making level to understand an economic principle
that is intuitively known by the Western water user and that has been officially
adopted-on paper-as the policy of the Department of the Army, the Department of the Interior, the Department of Agriculture, and the Department of
Health, Education and Welfare, and approved by the President. That is, that
in developing water resources the goal is "to provide the maximum net benefits," and that in counting costs against those benefits the government should
include "losses . . . and induced adverse effects . . . whether or not comThis quotation is worth more than a footnote citapensation is involved."
tion; it is from "Policies, Standards, and Procedures in the Formulation,
Evaluation, and Review of Plans for the Use and Development of Water and
Land Re:sources," prepared under the direction of the President's Water Resources Council in 1962. 5s What does it mean? It means that if the government initiates a water use for a military purpose on reserved land, and thereby deprives a farmer of water used for irrigation, the loss of the irrigation is
a cost of the new military use. It is a cost whether or not the government
pays the farmer. If, in addition to reserved land, the Defense Department
needs the farmer's land, it will pay him for it. But the land, too, was "given
away"--it was homesteaded by the farmer's grandfather. For years the land
and the water have increased the gross national product and the national welfare. This productive quality has given each a value. Now, if either land or
water must be used for military purposes, that gross .product and that welfare
will be decreased, and that value will be destroyed. The only issue is who
should bear the loss and pay the cost. Should it be paid from the national
treasury and borne by all those in the nation who get the benefit of the military post, or should the farmer be required to lay his costly sacrifice on the
altar of the public good?
If the reservation of water, or the navigation servitude, acts as a "sword
of Damocles" that may fall at any moment, ' 9 or as a "floating mortgage in
the sky" that may be foreclosed at any time for any amount," and this discourages development, this too is a cost of the ultimate national use of the
water. Costs of "induced adverse effects" and "foregone benefits" include
"opportunity costs," the loss of values that could be produced and added to
national wealth, but that are foregone because the insecurity of the water
right has frightened away the potential water user.
But suppose, as has been argued, that the compensation paid to the water
user, the "buy-back" price, were "prohibitive," so great that the government
project for the water was economically infeasible. Then, the government's
water policy statement tells us, the government does not want this project. It
would be a step in the wrong direction, a step away from maximum use. The
costs of the government use (including the loss to the farmer) would exceed
the benefits gained. An illustration from the private sector might demonstrate
58. S. Doc. No. 97, 87th Cong., 2d SESS. (1962).
59. Sen. Frank A. Barrett, 1956 Senate Hearings, supra note 2.
60. Northcutt Ely, 1964 Senate Hearings, supra note 2.
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this more clearly. Suppose we have a water source divided between an irrigator and a manufacturer, each of whom could increase his use. Because
the manufactured goods are worth more than the crops, the manufacturer
can buy water from the farmer, paying him more than the crops are worth.
But if we had a policy of preferring agriculture, so that the farmer could
take the water without paying for it, the added crops would be worth less
than the lost goods. Welfare would be decreased, the country would be less
rich.
So at the very least the states must continue to fight for the compensability
of water rights on the floor of Congress as the basic principle of the most
recent Kuchel bill,"' in presenting the views of the states on each future federal
project, and in the planning sessions of inter-agency and river basin commissions. The compensation principle is needed not because it sets states'
rights above the national powers, or private interests above national interests,
but because it is in the national interest and is in accord with the very policy
officially adopted by the agencies of the United States and approved by the
President of the United States.

61.

S. 1636, 89th Cong., 1st Srss. (1965).

